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In the SupreiDe Court 
of the State of Utah 
PHERRELL DRAPER, 
vs. 
Plaintiff ~and 
Resporndent, 
J. B. & R. E. WALKER, INC., A corpora-
tion, 
D·efiendant ·and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
7214 
PherreU Draper, respondent here was plaintiff 
below and J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., a corporation, 
appellant here was defendant below. In stating the facts, 
the parties will be referred to as plaintiff and defendant, 
respectively. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At all times mentioned in his complaint, plaintiff 
was the owner in fee and in possession of the land de-
scribed in his complaint, and Old MiH Tavern, Inc., a 
Utah corporation owned or claimed to own land adjoin-
ing plaintiff's, and by virtue of certain invalid tax deeds, 
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it claimed to own plaintiff's land. To test the validity 
of these tax deeds, it filed an action against plaintiff 
praying that title to said land be quieted in it. Plaintiff 
joined rssue and tria'l was had thereon. A decree was 
entered declaring the tax deeds to be invalid and title 
to the property was quieted in plaintiff. 
But while said action was pending, Old Mill Tavern 
made, executed and delivered to defendant, herein, a 
mortgage encumbering plaintiff's said land. (See para-
graphs 5 of both the complaint and answer herein.) 
Plaintiff knew nothing of this mortgage until long 
after it was put of record when his financial necessities 
impelled him to offer the land as security for a loan. 
Extension of his abstract in 1947 to satisfy his pros-
pective lender that his title was good, disclosed this 
mortgage to him for the first time. (Tr. pp. 7, 18, 35 
and 36) 
Upon discovery of said mortgage plaintiff prepared 
a release thereof to he signed by defendant which he de-
livered to defendant with a demand that it execute the 
same. Both the release and the demand were turned over 
to Mr. Burton, defendant's counsel, and plaintiff was 
directed to deal with him concerning the matter. (Tr. 
p.16) 
Accordingly, he saw Mr. Burton and told him of his 
demands for a release, whereupon Mr. Burton told him 
if he would sign an agreement and have a surveyor 
survey the property line within 60 days he would get 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a release. Plaintiff responded that the mortgage had 
no right on the property and that he did not feel disposed 
to incur any obligation to get a release. (Tr. p. 20) 
No claim was ever made that the mortgage had any 
validity. The answer admits ownership and possession 
of the mortgaged land in plaintiff and disclaims any 
interest therein. At the trial defendant, through its attor-
ney, made this statement : 
''In any event we make no claim for the 
validity of the mortgage on the property he de-
scribed here.'' ( T. p. 37) 
The nature of the obligation sought to be imposed 
upon plaintiff for the execution of a release is fully dis-
closed by statements made to plaintiff at the trial, in the 
form of questions by Mr. Burton, and by his sworn testi-
mony when he took the stand on behalf of defendant, and 
by defendant's Ex. 2, as follows: 
Q. When you first came to my office, Mr. 
Draper, we had a map of the Cottonwood 
area where your property and the Old Mill 
Property meets, did we not~ 
A. Wehadamap. 
Q. We had a discussion as to this adjoining line 
between yours and the property of the Old 
Mill, didn't we. 
A. We had a discussion on that, but I don't re-
caH the map. (T. p. 26) 
Q. In fact you said you knew you were encroach-
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4 
ing over on the Old Mill property the way 
you were using your property at that time? 
A. No, I never made that statement. (T. p. 27) 
Q. Well, when you first came in, you were ad-
vised we wanted to have a dividing line by the 
fence corrected to meet what any survey 
showed? 
A. I never made the statement I would correct 
the line. (T. p. 28) 
Q. I told you the only thing Mr. Walker wanted 
was to have the connecting line, the property 
line between the two of you adjusted. 
A. Yes, you told me that. ('T. p. 29) 
Q. And that if your fence was too far on your 
side that it could he moved over; if it was 
over on the Old Mill side, that it be moved to 
correspond to the line, that is all we were 
asking. 
A. You asked me that, and I refused. (T. p. 32) 
Mr. Burton's direct testimony: 
''I was directed to deliver the relea,se upon 
the securing of an agreement to correct the fence 
lines to a survey which was to be had. In a dis-
cussion in the office with the plaintiff, I explained 
that there was some question as to the fence lines 
between the two, it appearing to the defendant 
that there was an encroachment upon their lands, 
on the lands of the Old Mill Corporation, and they 
felt that the lines should he adjusted." (T. p. 54) 
Ex. 2 is a proposed agreement between plaintiff and 
defendant, prepared by defendant, in which defendant 
asserts ownership of land adjoining plaintiff's, on the 
disputed line. 
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Failing to get a release without incurring an obliga-
tion, therefor, plaintiff brought this suit. 
THE ISSUES 
Appellant cites 15 errors committed by the Court 
below raising the follo-wing questions: 
1. Does plaintiff's complaint state a cause of 
action? 
2. Did the court exceed its powers or discretion 
in allowing the prayer of the complaint to be 
amended1 
3. Was plaintiff entitled to an order requiring 
defendant to release the mortgage 1 
4. Is plaintiff entitled to damages and costs~· 
ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant demurred generally and specially to 
plaintiff's complaint and also moved to strike all of 
paragraph 9 thereof. The demurrer was overruled and 
the motion to strike denied. This is assigned as error, 
but all that is argued as error in defendant's brief is 
that under Section 78-3-8 of our statutes, plaintiff may 
not avail himself of both remedies therein provided. It 
is then categorically stated that plaintiff "may sue for 
double damages or he may sue to have the mortgage 
released and all damages from such failure, or he could 
sue in equity to quiet title against the land." 
That the "complaint was fatally defective and did 
not state a cause of action to permit the recovery of any 
relief other than that of quieting title, because there is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
nowhere contained in the complaint any allegation that 
the mortgage has been satisfied." 
That the "defendant was unable to determine from 
plaintiff's complaint which of the two causes of action 
provided by 78-3-8 the plaintiff was pursuing or whether 
an action only to quiet title." Appellant's Brief--
No authority, except Section 78-3-8 is cited to sup-
port the foregoing statements. 
Our Code of Civil Procedure provides that a com-
plaint must contain provisions as follows: 
"A statement of the facts constituting the 
cause of action in ordinary and concise language. 
A demand for relief which the plaintiff claims. 
If the recovery of money or damage is de-
manded, the amount must be stated." 104-7-2 
U.C.A. 1943 
Section 104-30-5 provides that any relief consistent 
with the case made by the complaint and embraced within 
the issues may be granted. 
Plaintiff's complaint in substance alleges that he 
was and is the owner in fee and in possession of certain 
land and had been for a long time. 
That Old Mill Tavern placed of record certain in-
valid tax deeds affecting plaintiff's land and then brought 
suit to quiet title to said 'land; that defendant joined 
issue in said suit, and while that action was pending the 
Old Mill Tavern gave and defendant accepted a mort-
I 
I 
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gage on the land involved in the action, knowing or 
charged with knowledge, that Old ~lill had no title to 
the land, and that they willfully and wrongfully cloude,d 
plaintiff's title by recording said mortgage; that the 
court in said action decreed the tax deeds to be invalid; 
that plaintiff knew nothing of said mortgage until after 
the conclusion of said action when he sought a loan on 
the land and had his abstract continued for that purpose; 
that he demanded of defendant that it release or cancel 
said mortgage of record, which defendant refused to do; 
that plaintiff suffered certain 'specified damage because 
of said refusal, in the total sum of $547.00. 
Plaintiff's prayer is as follows: 
"Wherefore, plaintiff prays judgment against 
defendant adjudging and decreeing that the mort-
gage aforesaid is null and void and of no effect 
and for an order requiring defiendant bo rele,ase 
said mortgage of recotrd insofar as it affects the 
title to the property aforesaid, and for judgment 
awarding plaintiff his costs herein expended and 
for damages in the 'SUm of $547.00." (Italics sup-
plied). 
Paragraph 9 of the complaint sets the damage forth 
in detail. Defendant moved to strike this paragraph and 
demurred generally to the whole complaint and specially 
to allegations concerning a warranty to Henry L. Butler, 
and to allegations concerning the placing of ~150.00 secur-
ing with a loan company against the cloud of said mort-
gage. 
The italicized words of the prayer were not in the 
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prayer at the time the demurrer and motion to 'Strike was 
ruled on, but were allowed as an amendment at the be-
ginning of the trial. 
It is submitted now that neither the demurrer or the 
motion to strike have any merit; nor has the objection 
made to the amendment any merit. 
Defendant elected not to stand on its demurrer and 
motion, or to appeal therefrom. Instead it answered and 
made its case at the trial. Whatever error, if any, was 
made in ruling on the pleadings were cured by defen-
dant's answer and by the facts presented by it at the 
trial. 
The answer admitted the ownership and possession 
of plaintiff, and it admitted the invalidity of the mort-
gage and the invalidity of the tax deeds upon which it 
was predicated. It also admitted the making and taking 
and recording of the mortgage by Old Mill Tavern and 
defendant while an action was pending to test the validity 
of the tax deed. (See paragraphs 1 to 6 of the complaint 
and answer.) 
At the trial, J. B. Walker was shown to be an officer 
of defendant company (Tr. p. 8); and the testimony 
quoted above in the Statement of Fact discloses that 
he acted for the Old Mill Tavern as one who had full 
authority to do so. That testimony and the admissions 
in the answer disclose that at the time plaintiff made his 
demand for release of the mortgage both Old :Mill Tav-
ern and defendant knew that mortgage, made and re-
corded by them while an action was pending to determine 
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ownership of the land, was absolutely null and void. It is 
further disclosed by compelling and legitimate inference 
therefrom, that the interests of Old l\1iH and defendant 
with respect to said mortgage are the same. 
Not only was the mortgage made and recorded un~er 
the circumstances above set forth, but when a release 
was demanded, plaintiff was shown a map where the 
property of plaintiff and Old Mill meet, and plaintiff 
was charged with saying that he knew -that he was ''en-
croaching over on the Old Mill Pr:operty. Plaintiff was 
advised that 'we' want 'a dividing line by the fence cor-
rected to meet what any survey showed,'' plaintiff to 
bear the cost of the survey. Who ''we'' are is drsclosed 
in the following statements quoted and cited above: 
"I told you (plaintiff) the only thing Mr. Walker 
wanted was to have the connecting line, between you two 
adjusted, that if the fence was too far on your side, that 
it could be moved over; if it was on the Old Mill side, 
that it be moved to correspond to the line, that is all 
we were asking. I was directed to deliver the release 
upon the securing of an agreement to correct the fence 
lines to a survey which was to be had. I explained that 
there was some question as to the fence lines between 
the two, it appearing to the dependamt that there was an 
encroachment upon lheir lands; on the lands of the Old 
Mill Corporation, and they felt that the lines should be 
adjusted.'' (Italics supplied.) 
In addition, defendant asserts ownership of the land 
adjoining plaintiff in its Exhibit 2. 
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It seems to us that it would impugn the intelligence 
of the court to spell out the meaning of the foregoing 
language. It shows without attempted construction that 
the interests of Old Mill and defendant with respect to 
said mortgage are the same and that Mr. Walker spoke 
for both of them. 
Defendant complains that the cause of action was 
changed by the amendment to the prayer of the com-
plaint and deprived defendant of substantial rights. 
A casual examination of the complaint will disclose 
the absurdity of this contention. 'The complaint alleges 
ownership and possession of the land at the time the 
tax deeds and mortgage were recorded and became 
clouds upon plaintiff's title. It further alleges that while 
the Old Mill Tavern and plaintiff were engaged in a suit 
in which plaintiff was challenging the validity of the tax 
deeds, that the Old Mill and defendant willfully and 
knowingly further clouded plaintiff's title by recording 
the aforesaid mortgage. 
The prayer of the complaint to which defendant 
demurred was merely that the court decree the mortgage 
to be null and void. If as matter of fact it was null and 
void the plaintiff was entitled to such a decree and if 
it was collusive and fraudulent, as a matter of right and 
equity, plaintiff was entitled to have it expunged from 
the record by a release or cancellation thereof. 
Since said mortgage is on record in the name of the 
defendant, it is the proper party to expunge the same 
from the record and as a matter of equity it should pay 
J 
I 
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damage for refusal to do so. 
It is elementary doctrine that the prayer is not a 
part of the complaint, and the defendant was required 
to do nothing after the amendment to meet the allega-
tions of the complaint than it could or did do after the 
amendment. 
But defendant cites section 78-3-8 U.C.A. 1943 and 
argues that plaintiff is estopped there by to recover dam-
ages from defendant for refusal to expunge its void 
mortgage from the records, on the theory that the com-
mon law did not allow damages for refusal to release a 
mortgage, and that said statute gives the right of dam-
ages to a mortgagor only. 
As authority for such doctrine defendant cites and 
quotes from Hasquet v. Big West, 29 Fed. 2nd 58, and 
Morrill v. Title 162, p. 360. The quote from the Morrill 
case cannot be found in the text of the opinion found 
at 162, p. 360. We assume, however, that the quote is 
from some other good authority. Whatever case it comes 
from it is authority for the doctrine that damages for 
refusal to satisfy a mortgage may be had in an equity 
action, and plaintiff's case is primarily an equity action 
and was so tried without a jury. 
Quoting from the real Morrill case, supra, it is made 
to appear that damages were allowed in such cases even 
at common law: 
''The effect of the statute is to substitute 
remedies. It postpones a right of action in the 
interest of peace. It provides a certain recovery 
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in all cases in lieu of the uncertainty of the com-
mon law action."-162 P. 362. 
It is our contention that under the facts and plead-
ings we are entitled to recover damages as a matter of 
equity, but even if the statute applies it does not deny, 
but merely defines and limits damages. 
But, says respondent, if the statutes applies, plain-
tiff does not come within its provisions: first, because 
there is no proof that the mortgage was ever paid or 
satisfied, and second because only a mortgagor may avail 
himself of the statute where only the mortgagor is named 
as beneficiary thereof because such statutes must be 
strictly construed and limited to operate only in favor 
of those included in the statutory designation. Citing 
and quoting from Hope v. United Savings, 60 P. 2nd, 737, 
and Graham v. Sindergaard, 238 Mich. 210, 213 N.W. 200, 
in support of these propositions. - Defendant's brief, 
page------· 
The first proposition is absurd because at the time 
demand was made to expunge the record by a release 
there was no n1ortgage obligation in existence. There 
was nothing to satisfy; nothing to do but expunge from 
the record a dead document with the appearance of life. 
As to the second proposition, it ha·s already been 
shown that the mortgagor and the mortgagee were one 
and the same in interest so far as keeping the void 
mortgage on record is concerned, and under no equitable 
doctrine could it be said that they had a right to exact 
from plaintiff a consideration for expunging the records. 
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Besides in not all cases has a strict construction of 
such statutes been slavishly adhered to. At the trial we 
cited, and now cite, the case of Van Doren v. Wolf 
(Kans.), 211 P. 1-1-!, based on a statute giving, in terms, 
only the mortgagor the right to damages upon refusal to 
satisfy a mortgage, but based upon circumstances set 
forth in the case they refused to follow the literal lan-
guage of the statute and gave a non-mortgagor relief 
under the statute. 
In the instant case, defendants own authorities show 
that equity may relieve such a situation, and if the stat-
ute applies at all, it applies only to limit and measure 
plaintiff's damage. 
We, therefore, conclude that the lower court com-
mitted no error and the judgment and decree should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. M. DRAPER, 
AMorney for Plaintiff 
rOIYIJd Respondent 
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